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Two studies examined the impact of subjective experiences on
reports of attitude certainty, intensity, and importance. In Study
1, participants with moderate or extreme attitudes toward
doctor-assisted suicide generated three (easy) or seven (hard)
arguments that either supported or countered their opinion
toward the issue prior to indicating the strength of their attitude.
Participants with moderate attitudes rated their opinions as
more intense, personally important, and held with greater cer-
tainty when they had generated either a small number of sup-
porting arguments or a large number of opposing arguments.
Ratings provided by individuals with extreme attitudes were
unaffected by the argument generation task. In Study 2, the
impact of ease of recall on strength-related judgments was elimi-
nated when it was rendered nondiagnostic by a misattribution
manipulation. Implications of these findings for attitude
strength and other judgmental phenomena are discussed.
Everyday experience suggests that we feel more
strongly about some topics than others. Within social
psychology, this observation is reflected in numerous
attempts to specify the “strength” associated with an atti-
tude. Since early discussions by Allport and Hartman
(1925), the topic of attitude strength has been of consid-
erable interest to attitude researchers and has been
addressed under various headings, including attitude
“intensity, centrality, salience, certainty, ego-involvement,
importance, confidence, crystallization, [and] ambiva-
lence” (Schuman & Presser, 1981, pp. 231-232). The
strength with which a person holds an attitude has a
number of important implications for predicting both
the stability of an attitude and the likelihood that an indi-
vidual will choose to act on an attitude (see Petty & Kros-
nick, 1995). For instance, important attitudes are more
stable over time (Krosnick, 1988), and attitudes based on
direct experience are more likely to guide behavior
(Fazio & Zanna, 1978). Given that the strength of peo-
ple’s attitudes can affect their cognition and their behav-
ior, Krosnick and Abelson (1992) have argued that inves-
tigators need to measure both the direction and the
strength of people’s attitudes.
Although research has increased our understanding
of the concept of attitude strength, our understanding
of the processes underlying how people determine the
strength of their attitudes is less developed (cf. Downing,
Judd, & Brauer, 1992; Fazio, 1995; Roese & Olson, 1994;
see also Festinger, 1957). How do people respond to
questions designed to assess strength-related properties?
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Are these judgments stable over time, or are they sensi-
tive to features of the situation in which they are formed?
Given the apparent utility of distinguishing between
people who hold “strong” and “weak” attitudes, these
would appear to be important questions. The studies
reported in this article identify one variable that influ-
ences judgments of attitude strength–related properties.
Specifically, we demonstrate that the ease with which
attitude-relevant information comes to mind can alter
people’s perceptions of their own attitudes.
THE CONCEPT OF ATTITUDE STRENGTH
As other researchers have noted, the concept of atti-
tude strength is not easily defined (Bassili, 1996b; Kros-
nick & Petty, 1995; Raden, 1985). The term is generally
used to describe attitudes that are (a) more persistent
over time, (b) more resistant to change, (c) more likely
to influence information processing and judgments,
and (d) more likely to guide behavior (Krosnick & Petty,
1995).
A number of attitudinal attributes have been used to
differentiate between strong versus weak attitudes. In a
comprehensive review, Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang,
Berent, and Carnot (1993) identified 10 different
dimensions that have been examined in previous
research: extremity, intensity, certainty, importance,
interest, knowledge, accessibility, direct experience, lati-
tudes of rejection, and affective-cognitive consistency.
Krosnick et al. (1993) demonstrated that these indices
do not represent a single latent construct. More recently,
Krosnick and Petty (1995) have organized these dimen-
sions into four broad categories. Some dimensions of
attitude strength are attributes of the attitude itself. For
instance, attitude extremity is operationalized as the
degree of deviation of an attitude from the midpoint of
an attitude scale (Abelson, 1995). Other dimensions of
attitude strength are based on the cognitive structure of
an attitude. For instance, the amount of knowledge an
individual possesses about a topic, the accessibility of an
attitude, and the level of ambivalence associated with an
attitude are all concerned with the strength of associa-
tive links among an individual’s evaluations and cogni-
tions. Other dimensions of attitude strength are derived
from an individual’s subjective beliefs about their atti-
tudes. For instance, people care about some attitudes
more than others; this dimension is referred to as atti-
tude importance (Krosnick, 1988). Similarly, people
have subjective beliefs about the intensity with which
they hold an attitude as well as how certain or confident
they are in their position. Finally, Krosnick and Petty
(1995) have identified a dimension that emphasizes the
elaborative processes through which an attitude is
organized. These categories highlight the fact that dif-
ferent factors can contribute to the strength of an atti-
tude and are consistent with the premise that different
dimensions may be associated with different patterns of
results (Krosnick & Schuman, 1988).
Our interest in the topic of attitude strength was moti-
vated by a desire to understand how people respond to
questions designed to assess strength-related properties
and the extent to which such reports might vary as a
function of the subjective experiences that accompany the
accessibility of attitude-relevant information. As a result,
we were primarily interested in how individuals might
derive responses to questions that measure those opera-
tionalizations that Krosnick and Petty (1995) labeled
subjective beliefs (e.g., attitude certainty, intensity, and
importance).
THE DERIVATION OF SUBJECTIVE
REPORTS OF ATTITUDE STRENGTH
Recent research and theorizing suggests that subjec-
tive beliefs or reports of attitude strength can vary as a
function of the context in which the judgment is pro-
vided. For instance, Bassili (1993, 1996a, 1996b) has
stated that individuals typically do not have ready-made
assessments of the strength of their attitudes, a position
consistent with the assertion that subjective belief
dimensions of attitude strength are malleable. In his
research, Bassili (1993, 1996a, 1996b) has offered the
distinction between operative and meta-attitudinal
measures of attitude strength. Bassili (1993) defined
operative indices as “direct manifestations of the infor-
mation processing involved in an attitude judgment”
(p. 55). Response latency (see Fazio, 1995) is a prime
example of an operative index of attitude strength. Bas-
sili (1993) defined meta-attitudinal indices as those that
require respondents to “reflect on their attitudes and
report their “impressions” of it” (p. 56). Bassili (1993)
classified attitude certainty, intensity, and importance as
examples of meta-attitudinal indices of attitude
strength. In a series of studies, Bassili (1993, 1996b) has
explored the distinction between operative and meta-
attitudinal indices of attitude strength and whether
these different classes of measures are differentially reac-
tive. As predicted, Bassili has found that operative and
meta-attitudinal measures form distinct clusters, that
operative measures account for unique variance in atti-
tude pliability and stability, and that meta-attitudinal
measures were poorer predictors of the relation between
people’s attitudes and behavior. In line with the primary
thesis of the present research, Bassili (1996b) stated
that “under most circumstances, people do not have
direct access to ready-made assessments of how strong
their attitudes are” (p. 639) and that “meta-attitudinal
measures are particularly susceptible to extraneous
influences” (p. 637). These conclusions are consistent
with the proposal tested in this article: Reports of sub-
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jective or meta-attitudinal indices of attitude strength
may differ as a function of the subjective experiences
that accompany the retrieval of attitude-relevant
information.
Research by Roese and Olson (1994) is also consis-
tent with the proposal that reports of attitude
strength–related dimensions can vary as a function of
the context in which they are provided. Roese and Olson
examined whether the frequency of attitude expression
affects reports of attitude importance (cf. Krosnick,
1988). They observed that the repeated expression of an
attitude heightened people’s perceptions of its impor-
tance. Roese and Olson (1994) interpreted their find-
ings by suggesting that perceivers may “use the ease
with which attitudinal information comes to mind as a
heuristic cue for inferring perceived attitude impor-
tance” (pp. 46-47). Although Roese and Olson’s (1994)
study did not explicitly test the notion that ease of
retrieval can be used as a cue to infer subjective judg-
ments of attitude strength, more recent research has
started to directly investigate this question.
THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES
ON ATTITUDE STRENGTH JUDGMENTS
Although investigators have long assumed that judg-
ments can be affected by the ease with which informa-
tion comes to mind, direct evidence of this effect has
only recently been provided. In research derived from
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) work on the availability
heuristic, Schwarz et al. (1991, Study 1) asked a group of
participants to recall either 6 or 12 instances in which
they behaved assertively. Pretesting revealed that recall-
ing 6 examples was easy, whereas retrieving 12 instances
was difficult. After completing this behavior-recollection
task, participants then rated their own assertiveness. If
judgments are determined by the content (i.e., number)
of recalled behaviors, one would predict higher ratings
of assertiveness among those asked to recall 12 behav-
iors. In contrast, if, as Schwarz et al. (1991) predicted,
judgments are determined by the subjective experience
of ease associated with the retrieval task, one would pre-
dict higher ratings of assertiveness among those asked to
recall 6 behaviors. The results supported Schwarz et al.’s
(1991) prediction, suggesting that people can rely on
the subjective ease with which information comes to
mind in forming judgments.
We believe that subjective ease of retrieval may serve
as a source of information that individuals might use in
deriving reports of attitude certainty, intensity, and
importance. Consistent with this proposal, two studies
have demonstrated that ease of retrieval influences sub-
jective reports of attitude strength. In one study, Had-
dock, Rothman, and Schwarz (1996) asked participants
to generate either three or seven arguments that either
supported or opposed their attitude toward doctor-
assisted suicide. Participants found it easy to recall three
arguments but difficult to recall seven. After completing
this task, participants rated the certainty, intensity, and
importance of their attitude toward the issue. If partici-
pants used the ease or difficulty with which they could
bring the material to mind as a source of information,
they should report greater certainty, intensity, and
importance after recalling three rather than seven sup-
porting arguments or recalling seven rather than three
opposing arguments. The results were consistent with
this prediction: Participants reported that their attitudes
were stronger when they had experienced either an easy
time retrieving supporting arguments or a difficult time
retrieving opposing arguments.
Wänke, Bless, and Biller (1996) have also observed
that ease of retrieval affects attitude-based judgments. In
this study, participants’ attitudes about the use of public
transportation were more favorable after having had an
easy time generating supporting arguments or a hard
time generating counterarguments toward the issue. Of
interest to our research, participants felt more confident
about their attitude after having had an easy time gener-
ating supporting arguments.
Taken together, the findings reported by Haddock et al.
(1996) and Wänke et al. (1996) indicate that subjective
judgments of attitude strength are affected by the ease
(or difficulty) associated with generating either support-
ing or counterarguments from memory. In the present
research, our goal was to replicate and extend these find-
ings by (a) considering a variable that might moderate
the impact of subjective experiences on judgments of
attitude certainty, intensity, and importance and (b) pro-
viding evidence that bears directly on the role of experi-
enced ease of retrieval as a mediator of these effects. In
our first study, we examined whether the extremity of an
individual’s preexisting attitude would moderate the
impact of subjective experiences on reports of attitude
certainty, intensity, and importance. We hypothesized
that ease of retrieval effects would be limited to individu-
als with a moderate attitude toward our target issue. In
our second study, we included a misattribution manipu-
lation that led some participants to discount the diagnos-
ticity of their subjective experience. Following from
research by Schwarz et al. (1991, Study 3), we expected
that participants would draw on their subjective experi-
ence only when it was diagnostic.
STUDY 1: ATTITUDE EXTREMITY,
EASE OF RETRIEVAL, AND ATTITUDE
STRENGTH JUDGMENTS
Although research by Haddock et al. (1996) and
Wänke et al. (1996) has documented that subjective
judgments of attitude strength can rest on the ease or dif-
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ficulty with which attitude-relevant arguments come to
mind, it is not the only type of information on which peo-
ple can base strength-related judgments. Three lines of
reasoning suggest that the impact of subjective experi-
ences on judgments of attitude certainty, intensity, and
importance might differ as a function of the extremity of
an individual’s attitude.
A first line of reasoning rests on the distinction
between operative and meta-attitudinal indices of atti-
tude strength (Bassili, 1993, 1996a, 1996b). Meta-
attitudinal indices of attitude strength, such as certainty,
intensity, and importance, are generally not represented
in memory. However, people who have extensive experi-
ence with an issue and have had reason to repeatedly
express their attitude on that issue may develop a memo-
rial representation of these strength-related properties
and thus may have more direct access as to whether their
attitude is intense, important, and held with greater cer-
tainty (see Bassili, 1996a, 1996b). We would suggest that
these individuals are more likely to hold extreme than
moderate attitudes. As a result, judgments of only indi-
viduals with moderate attitudes should be affected by the
context in which the judgment is formed.
Second, reliance on the relative ease with which infor-
mation comes to mind can be considered a heuristic
judgmental strategy, and previous research suggests that
individuals are more likely to rely on heuristic strategies
when the task is less involving and personally relevant
(Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken,
1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Rothman & Schwarz,
1998). For example, Rothman and Schwarz asked men
with or without a family history of heart disease to recall
few or many behaviors that increase or decrease their
personal risk of heart disease. Rothman and Schwarz
found that ease of retrieval effects were limited to men
without a family history of heart disease. These individu-
als, for whom the issue was less personally relevant, relied
on their recall experiences when they subsequently
assessed their own vulnerability to heart disease. Specifi-
cally, they reported higher vulnerability after recalling a
few (easy) rather than many (difficult) risk-increasing
factors and after recalling many rather than a few risk-
decreasing factors. Consistent with dual-process models
of information processing (see Chaiken & Trope, in
press), these findings suggest that reliance on subjective
accessibility experiences is particularly likely when the
task is not very involving. Given the documented finding
that topics about which individuals hold moderate atti-
tudes are less involving to the individual compared to
topics on which they hold extreme attitudes (see Leippe
& Elkin, 1987; Thomsen, Borgida, & Lavine, 1995), we
would predict that individuals who hold moderate atti-
tudes are more likely to rely on their subjective
experiences.
A third line of reasoning is based on the finding that
individuals are more committed to extreme (compared
to moderate) attitudes and that individuals highly com-
mitted to their attitudes are less likely to change their
opinions (e.g., Johnson & Eagly, 1989; Kiesler, 1971;
Krosnick, 1988). Consistent with this observation, a
number of studies have revealed that thinking about the
reasons underlying one’s attitude produces attitude
change, but particularly among individuals with less
crystallized attitudes (e.g., Hodges & Wilson, 1993; Wil-
son, Kraft, & Dunn, 1989).
Taken together, these three lines of reasoning (and
research underlying their assumptions) support the pre-
diction that the ease associated with generating attitude-
relevant arguments would influence judgments of
attitude certainty, intensity, and importance made by
individuals who held moderate attitudes. Although indi-
viduals with extreme attitudes were expected to provide
higher ratings of attitude certainty, intensity, and impor-
tance as compared to those with moderate attitudes, the
judgments of individuals with extreme attitudes should
be unaffected by the relative ease with which attitude-
relevant arguments come to mind.
METHOD
Participants and Design
Participants were 80 students recruited from an intro-
ductory psychology subject pool. The study took the
form of a 2 (argument type: supporting arguments vs.
counterarguments) × 2 (argument number: three vs.
seven arguments) × 2 (prior attitude: moderate vs.
extreme attitude) between-subjects design.1 Participants
were randomly assigned to one level of the first two
manipulated variables (see below for how participants
were categorized as possessing extreme versus moderate
attitudes).
Materials and Procedure
Selection of participants. Participants were selected on
the basis of their responses to a mass-testing question-
naire administered at the beginning of the academic
term. Among the measures they completed in the pre-
test questionnaire was a question concerning their atti-
tude toward doctor-assisted suicide. Respondents indi-
cated their attitude toward the issue on a 7-point scale (1 =
I am strongly opposed to doctor-assisted suicide, 7 = I am
strongly in favor of doctor-assisted suicide). Thirty-eight par-
ticipants whose response to the pretest question placed
them at either of the scale’s endpoints served as the
extreme attitude group in our study. Of these individu-
als, 20 held extremely positive attitudes (i.e., they were
strongly in favor of the issue), and 18 held extremely
negative attitudes. Within each of these groups,
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approximately half of the participants generated argu-
ments that spoke in favor of the issue, whereas the others
generated arguments that spoke against the issue. As a
result, approximately half of the extreme attitude partici-
pants provided arguments that supported their attitude,
whereas the others provided arguments that countered
their attitude.2
The moderate attitude participants in our study (n =
42) responded to the pretest item by reporting that they
were either “somewhat in favor of (or opposed to)
doctor-assisted suicide.” Of these individuals, 20
reported moderately positive attitudes, and 22 reported
moderately negative attitudes. Within each of these
groups, approximately half of the participants gener-
ated arguments that spoke in favor of the issue, whereas
the others generated arguments that spoke against the
issue. Once again, these procedures insured that
approximately half of the moderate attitude participants
provided arguments that supported their attitude,
whereas the others provided arguments that countered
their attitude.
Experimental session. Participants arrived to the labora-
tory in groups of 2 to 7 for a study on “social issues.” The
cover page of the experimental booklet informed par-
ticipants that we were interested in understanding stu-
dents’ thoughts about allowing doctors to assist in the
suicide of terminally ill patients. On the next page, par-
ticipants were told that we were interested in the reasons
or arguments that people on both sides of the issue
might use in a discussion about the topic. They were
then asked to provide three (or seven) arguments that
spoke in favor of (or against) the issue. After completing
this task, participants completed questions assessing the
certainty, intensity, and importance of their attitude
toward doctor-assisted suicide. These questions were the
same as those used by Haddock et al. (1996) and were
adapted from Krosnick et al. (1993). Two questions were
used to measure each of the dimensions (see Table 1).
For each question, participants were asked to provide on
a 7-point scale the degree to which their attitude was
intense, important, and held with certainty (1 = not at all
intense, important, certain, etc., 7 = very intense, important,
certain, etc.). On completing these questions, partici-
pants reported how difficult they found the argument
generation task (1 = not at all difficult, 7 = very difficult).
Next, participants rated whether each generated argu-
ment supported or countered their attitude (this was
done to ensure that participants properly followed the
instructions) as well as how convincing each generated
argument was (1 = not at all convincing, 7 = very convinc-
ing). Finally, participants in the three-argument condi-
tion were asked to generate four additional arguments
before providing demographic information. Partici-
pants in the seven-argument condition completed only
the demographic questions at this stage of the study. All




To ensure that the difficulty associated with the argu-
ments generation task differed between the three- and
seven-argument conditions, we compared participants’
difficulty ratings. As expected, participants found it eas-
ier to generate three (M = 3.48) as compared to seven (M =
5.03) arguments, F(1,72) = 15.03, p < .001. There was also
a significant main effect of argument type. Participants
who generated supporting arguments reported less diffi-
culty (M = 3.81) than did people who generated counter-
arguments (M = 4.74), F(1, 72) = 5.36, p < .05. No other
effects approached significance.
To ensure that the quality of the arguments generated
did not differ across conditions, we examined how con-
vincing participants found the arguments that they had
generated. As a measure of convincingness, we took the
average of the ratings participants provided for their last
two arguments (see Haddock et al., 1996). An ANOVA
revealed that the last two arguments generated by par-
ticipants in the seven-argument condition were rated as
convincing as the second and third arguments generated
by participants in the three-argument condition (F < 1).
This finding is important, because the extent to which
generating many arguments is difficult. Those gener-
ated near the end of the task might be less convincing,
providing a possible alternative explanation for a shift in
certainty, intensity, and importance ratings. The sole sig-
nificant effect in this analysis was a main effect of argu-
ment type, F(1, 59) = 9.60, p < .05. Participants who pro-
vided arguments that supported their opinion rated
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TABLE 1: Questions Used to Assess Attributes of Attitude Strength
1. How certain are you about your attitude toward the issue of doctor-assisted suicide? (certainty)
2. How firm is your opinion toward the issue of doctor-assisted suicide? (certainty)
3. How intense is your attitude toward the issue of doctor-assisted suicide? (intensity)
4. How strong is your attitude toward the issue of doctor-assisted suicide? (intensity)
5. How important is your attitude toward the issue of doctor-assisted suicide to you personally? (importance)
6. How much does your attitude toward the issue of doctor-assisted suicide mean to you? (Importance)
their last two arguments as more convincing (M = 4.72)
than did participants who provided opposing arguments
(M = 3.64).
Judgments of Attitude Strength
As in the study of Haddock et al. (1996), judgments of
certainty, intensity, and importance were combined to
form a composite index of attitude strength (α = .91).3
Because investigators frequently assess these dimensions
independently, we also report separate analyses for the
certainty, intensity, and importance measures.
Composite measure. The analysis on the composite
measure revealed a main effect of prior attitude, F(1, 72) =
22.02, p < .001. As expected, individuals with extreme
attitudes (M = 5.60) rated their attitudes as stronger than
did participants with moderate attitudes (M = 4.40).
However, this effect was qualified by a marginally signifi-
cant three-way interaction, F(1, 72) = 3.19, p = .07. As
expected, responses of participants with moderate atti-
tudes differed as a function of the ease or difficulty they
experienced in generating supporting or opposing argu-
ments. The left-hand side of the top panel of Table 2
presents the mean judgments made by individuals with
moderate attitudes. As can be seen, participants who
provided arguments that supported their position
judged their attitude as stronger after having generated
three (M = 5.04) as compared to seven (M = 4.11) argu-
ments. Conversely, participants who provided argu-
ments that countered their position judged their atti-
tude as stronger after having generated seven (M = 4.55)
as compared to three (M = 3.82) arguments. This pattern
of means is reflected by a significant argument type by
argument number interaction, F(1, 72) = 4.74, p < .05,
and is consistent with our hypothesis that subjective
experiences would influence judgments made by indi-
viduals with moderate attitudes.
The right-hand side of the top panel presents the
mean judgments made by individuals with extreme atti-
tudes. As can be seen, there were no differences among
judgments as a function of argument number and argu-
ment type.
Attitude certainty. The analysis on the certainty mea-
sure revealed a main effect of prior attitude, F(1, 72) =
30.52, p < .001. As expected, individuals with extreme
attitudes (M = 6.12) held their attitudes with greater cer-
tainty than did participants with moderate attitudes (M =
4.52). However, this effect was qualified by a marginally
significant three-way interaction, F(1, 72) = 3.10, p = .08.
Further analyses revealed that the responses of partici-
pants with moderate attitudes differed as a function of
argument type and argument number, F(1, 72) = 3.06, p =
.08. As can be seen in the second panel of Table 2, the
pattern of means is consistent with what would be
expected if individuals used their subjective experience
as a source of information. In contrast, the responses of
participants with extreme attitudes did not differ across
conditions.
Attitude intensity. The analysis on the intensity measure
revealed a main effect of prior attitude, F(1, 72) = 16.55,
p < .001. As expected, individuals with extreme attitudes
(M = 5.55) rated their attitudes as more intense than did
participants with moderate attitudes (M = 4.37). How-
ever, this effect was qualified by a significant three-way
interaction, F(1, 72) = 3.75, p = .05. Further analyses
revealed that the responses of participants with moder-
ate attitudes differed as a function of argument type and
argument number, F(1, 72) = 9.86, p < .01. As can be seen
in the third panel of Table 2, the pattern of means is con-
sistent with what would be expected if individuals used
their subjective experience as a source of information.
In contrast, the responses of participants with extreme
attitudes did not differ across conditions.
Attitude importance. The analysis on the importance
measure revealed a main effect of prior attitude, F(1, 72) =
9.79, p < .01. As was observed for ratings of attitude inten-
sity and certainty, individuals with extreme attitudes (M =
5.11) rated their attitudes as more important than did
participants with moderate attitudes (M = 4.24).
Although the three-way interaction was not significant,
F(1, 72) = 1.73, p = .19, the pattern of responses among
people with moderate and with extreme attitudes was
consistent with our predictions. As can be seen in the
bottom panel of Table 2, people with moderate attitudes
appeared to rely on the ease with which information
came to mind, whereas people with extreme attitudes
were unaffected by the generation task.
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TABLE 2: Judments of Attitude Strength as a Function of Argument
Type Argument Number, and Attitude Extremity, Study 1
Attitude Extremity
Moderate Extreme
Argument Three Seven Three Seven
Type Arguments Arguments Arguments Arguments
Composite measure
Supporting 5.04 4.11 5.52 5.42
Counter 3.82 4.55 5.87 5.60
Attitude certainty
Supporting 5.33 4.09 5.72 5.90
Counter 4.15 4.39 6.67 6.20
Attitude intensity
Supporting 5.04 4.05 5.61 5.10
Counter 3.40 4.94 5.89 5.65
Attitude importance
Supporting 4.75 4.18 5.17 5.25
Counter 3.60 4.33 5.06 4.95
NOTE: Higher scores represent higher ratings.
DISCUSSION
The results of the study confirmed the hypothesis that
accessibility experiences affect subjective reports of atti-
tude strength–related properties, but only among par-
ticipants with moderate attitudes. The findings are con-
sistent with Bassili’s (1996a, 1996b) proposal that
individuals with moderate attitudes do not have direct
access to meta-attitudinal (i.e., subjective) judgments
about the strength of their attitudes. Furthermore, our
results are consistent with research that has examined
the impact of analyzing reasons on attitude change
(Hodges & Wilson, 1993).
Although the results obtained in Study 1, along with
those obtained by Haddock et al. (1996) and Wänke et al.
(1996), indicate that subjective experiences associated
with the generation of supporting or counter arguments
can affect subjective judgments of strength-related prop-
erties, the hypothesized mediator has not been tested
directly. If these findings are indeed mediated by an indi-
vidual’s subjective experience during recall, the inclu-
sion of a misattribution manipulation designed to
undermine the diagnosticity of the subjective experi-
ence should produce different effects.
STUDY 2: MISATTRIBUTION, EASE OF RETRIEVAL,
AND ATTITUDE STRENGTH JUDGMENTS
The objective of Study 2 was to obtain direct evidence
for the role of accessibility experiences as a mediator of
our findings. To accomplish this goal, we used a misattri-
bution paradigm that has been used successfully in prior
research to demonstrate the mediating effect of ease of
retrieval on judgment (Rothman & Hardin, 1997, Study 2;
Schwarz et al., 1991, Study 3). For example, Schwarz et al.
(1991, Study 3) observed that participants only relied on
their subjective experience of ease or difficulty of
retrieval when its diagnosticity was not called into ques-
tion. In their study, Schwarz et al. asked participants to
recall 6 (easy) or 12 (difficult) examples of assertive
behaviors and informed participants that music played
during the recall task might render recall easy (or diffi-
cult). As expected, participants relied on their recall
experience only when the alleged side effect of the
music contradicted these experiences, thus rendering
them diagnostic. Under high diagnosticity, participants
judged themselves as more assertive after recalling 6
rather than 12 examples of their own assertive behaviors.
However, when the alleged side effect of the music
matched participants’ experiences, thus rendering
them nondiagnostic, participants based their assertive-
ness judgments on the content of recall and reported
higher assertiveness after recalling 12 rather than 6
examples of assertive behaviors.
We adapted this paradigm for our second study. Simi-
lar to our first study, participants in Study 2 were asked to
generate either three or seven arguments that either
supported or countered their attitude toward doctor-
assisted suicide. However, participants completed this
task while listening to a selection of music. Some partici-
pants were led to believe that the music would facilitate
thought, whereas other participants were led to believe
that the music would inhibit thought. Learning that the
music would facilitate thought should reduce the diag-
nosticity associated with having had an easy time gener-
ating three arguments. Similarly, learning that the music
would inhibit thought should reduce the diagnosticity
associated with having a difficult time generating seven
arguments. The remaining combinations of these vari-
ables (learning that music inhibits thought but having
had an easy time generating three arguments or learn-
ing that music facilitates thought but having had a hard
time generating seven arguments) should lead partici-
pants to conclude that their subjective experience was
highly diagnostic.
Consistent with the findings of Schwarz et al. (1991,
Study 3), we expected our participants to draw on the
ease of their recall experience when its diagnosticity was
not called into question but to draw on the content of




Participants were 78 students (40 females, 38 males)
recruited from the introductory psychology subject pool
and randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (argument
type: supporting vs. counter arguments) × 2 (argument
number: three vs. seven arguments) × 2 (diagnosticity:
high vs. low diagnosticity of experienced ease of recall)
between-subjects design.4
Materials and Procedure
Participants came to the laboratory in groups of three
to seven for a study on “music and reasoning.” They were
misinformed that past research had revealed that listen-
ing to certain types of music strongly facilitates or inhib-
its thought and that during the experimental session
they would be asked to complete a task while listening to
a selection of music. On the cover page of the experi-
ment booklet, participants were provided with four
pieces of information about their musical selection. The
first three pieces of information were constant across
participants. All participants learned that the music
would play throughout the session, would be a classical
selection, and would be played at a medium level of vol-
ume. The fourth piece of information provided the
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misattribution manipulation. Some participants learned
that the music would have the impact of facilitating
recall, whereas the remaining participants learned that
the music would inhibit recall.
After reading this information, the music was started
and participants proceeded with the task. Similar to
Study 1, the task instructions indicated that we were
interested in understanding students’ attitudes toward
allowing doctors to assist in the suicide of terminally ill
patients. First, participants reported their attitude
toward the issue on a 7-point scale (1 = bad, 7 = good). On
the next page, participants were instructed that we were
interested in the reasons or arguments that people on
both sides of the issue might use in a discussion about the
topic. They then generated three (or seven) arguments
that spoke in favor of (or against) their attitude. After
finishing this task, participants completed the attitude
certainty, intensity, and importance questions. On com-
pleting these questions, participants rated the difficulty
of the argument generation task and answered a series of
questions concerning the musical selection (these were
included to provide further rationale for the cover
story). Next, participants rated whether each generated
argument supported or countered their attitude and the
convincingness of each generated argument. At this
point, participants in the three-argument condition gen-
erated four additional arguments before providing
demographic information. Participants in the seven-
argument condition only completed the demographic
questions. Finally, participants were debriefed as to the
nature of research, thanked, and dismissed.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
To ensure that ease of retrieval differed between the
three- and seven-argument conditions, we compared
participants’ difficulty ratings. As expected, participants
found it easier to generate three (M = 3.54) as compared
to seven (M = 5.00) arguments, F(1,70) = 15.21, p < .001.
No other effects approached significance.
As in Study 1, we also examined whether the self-rated
convincingness of participants’ arguments differed as a
function of our manipulations. An ANOVA revealed that
participants in the three- and seven-argument condi-
tions did not differ in the ratings of their last two argu-
ments. The ANOVA did reveal a significant main effect
of argument type, F(1, 53) = 17.55, p < .01. Participants
who provided arguments that supported their opinion
rated their last two arguments as more convincing (M =
4.81) than did participants who provided opposing argu-
ments (M = 3.52). There was also a main effect of diag-
nosticity, F(1, 53) = 7.63, p < .05. Participants whose expe-
rience was highly diagnostic rated their last two
arguments as more convincing (M = 4.50) than did par-
ticipants who provided opposing arguments (M = 3.91).
Judgments of Attitude Strength
As in Study 1, we present the data collapsed across all
questions (α = .90) and separately for attitude certainty,
intensity, and importance.
Composite measure. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA yielded a signifi-
cant three-way interaction, F(1, 70) = 5.85, p < .02. As can
be seen in the left-hand side of the top panel of Table 3,
when the diagnosticity of the subjective experience was
high, participants used this experience as information in
deriving their judgments. This is reflected by a margin-
ally significant two-way interaction, F(1, 70) = 3.06, p =
.09. When asked to provide supporting arguments, par-
ticipants reported greater attitude certainty, intensity,
and importance after having generated three (M = 5.05)
rather than seven (M = 4.02) arguments. In contrast,
when asked to report counter arguments, participants
reported greater strength after having generated seven
(M = 4.08) rather than three (M = 3.77) arguments.
The pattern was opposite, however, when the alleged
effects of the music rendered the subjective experience
noninformative. As can be seen in the right-hand side of
the top panel, when the diagnosticity of the subjective
experience was low, the results suggest that participants
used the content of recalled information in making their
strength judgments. This is reflected by a marginally sig-
nificant two-way interaction, F(1, 70) = 3.34, p = .07.
When asked to provide supporting arguments, partici-
pants reported greater certainty, intensity, and impor-
tance after having generated seven (M = 4.35) rather
than three (M = 3.61) arguments. In contrast, when
asked to report counterarguments, participants
reported greater strength after having generated three
(M = 4.11) rather than seven (M = 3.70) arguments.
Attitude certainty. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA yielded a signifi-
cant three-way interaction, F(1, 70) = 5.89, p < .02. As can
be seen in the second panel of Table 3, when the diag-
nosticity of the subjective experience was high, partici-
pants used this experience as information in making
their certainty judgments. This is reflected by a margin-
ally significant two-way interaction, F(1, 70) = 3.63, p =
.06. In contrast, when the diagnosticity of the subjective
experience was low, the results suggest that participants
used the content of recalled information in making their
judgments. This is reflected by a marginally significant
two-way interaction, F(1, 70) = 2.58, p = .12.
Attitude intensity. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA yielded a signifi-
cant three-way interaction, F(1, 70) = 7.50, p < .01. As can
be seen in the third panel of Table 3, when the diagnos-
ticity of the subjective experience was high, participants
used this experience as information in deriving intensity
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judgments. This is reflected by a significant two-way
interaction, F(1, 70) = 4.40, p < .05. In contrast, when the
diagnosticity of the subjective experience was low, the
results suggest that participants used the content of
recalled information in making their strength judg-
ments. This is reflected by a significant two-way interac-
tion, F(1, 70) = 3.97, p = .05.
Attitude importance. A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA failed to yield a
significant three-way interaction, F(1, 70) = 1.52, p = .22.
However, the means in both the high and low diagnostic-
ity conditions were in the expected direction (see the
bottom panel of Table 3).
DISCUSSION
The results of Study 2 provided direct evidence for the
role of accessibility experiences as a mediator of our pre-
vious findings. Individuals who believed that their sub-
jective experience was diagnostic relied on this informa-
tion in deriving their judgment. In contrast, when
participants were induced to discount their subjective
experience, they relied on the content of the informa-
tion they had brought to mind. These results are consis-
tent with those obtained by Schwarz et al. (1991, Study 3)
and provide strong evidence in support of the impact of
accessibility experiences on subjective judgments of
strength-related properties.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Although there has been a considerable amount of
research about differences between strong and weak atti-
tudes (e.g., Petty & Krosnick, 1995), we have a poorer
understanding of how people determine whether an
attitude is important, intense, or certain. The present
research sought to determine the extent to which subjec-
tive experiences associated with the retrieval of attitude-
relevant information from memory would affect these
judgments. Recent research (e.g., Haddock et al., 1996;
Wänke et al., 1996) has suggested that some reports of
attitude strength are indeed influenced by the ease asso-
ciated with the retrieval of arguments that are relevant to
the target attitude object. The present research was
designed to replicate and extend these findings by (a)
considering a variable that might moderate the impact
of subjective experiences on attitude strength-related
judgments and (b) providing evidence directly support-
ing the role of the subjective ease of retrieval as a media-
tor of these results.
The primary purpose of Study 1 was to determine
whether the impact of subjective experiences on judg-
ment would be moderated by an individual’s preexisting
attitude toward the attitude issue. Based on the premise
that individuals with extreme attitudes are more likely to
have summary assessments of strength represented in
memory (Bassili, 1996a, 1996b) as well as the prediction
derived from dual-process models of attitude change
(e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) that
people are more likely to rely on heuristic strategies
when considering issues that are not of great personal
relevance, it was predicted that ease of retrieval effects
would be limited to those individuals with moderate atti-
tudes toward doctor-assisted suicide. The results of the
study supported our hypothesis: Individuals with moder-
ate attitudes were affected by their accessibility experi-
ences in deriving judgments of attitude certainty, inten-
sity, and importance, whereas individuals with extreme
attitudes were not.5
Using a misattribution paradigm previously
employed by Schwarz et al. (1991), Study 2 tested
directly whether people relied on their accessibility
experience in forming perceptions of their attitude
toward an issue. It was predicted that participants would
rely on their accessibility experience when it was diag-
nostic, but on the content of accessed information when
the experience was rendered nondiagnostic. Consistent
with our prediction, only when the subjective experi-
ence was perceived as diagnostic was it considered as a
source of information in responding to questions assess-
ing attitude certainty, intensity, and importance.
Implications of our Findings on
the Construct of Attitude Strength
Our findings suggest that subjective assessments of
strength-related properties are subject to contextual
manipulations. In this sense, they are consistent with
Bassili’s (1996a, 1996b) proposal that individuals do not
necessarily have direct access to judgments regarding
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TABLE 3: Judgments of Attitude Strength as a Function of Argument
Type, Argument Number, and Diagnosticity: Study 2
Diagnosticity
High Low
Argument Three Seven Three Seven
Type Arguments Arguments Arguments Arguments
Composite measure
Supporting 5.05 4.02 3.61 4.35
Counter 3.77 4.08 4.11 3.70
Attitude certainty
Supporting 5.36 4.28 4.03 5.06
Counter 4.13 4.55 4.68 4.17
Attitude intensity
Supporting 5.00 3.94 3.43 4.28
Counter 3.31 3.90 4.05 3.50
Attitude importance
Supporting 4.79 3.83 3.37 3.72
Counter 3.88 3.80 3.59 3.44
NOTE: Higher scores represent higher ratings.
the strength of their attitudes. What does this imply
about the construct of attitude strength? Perhaps most
important, our results indicate that investigators
should be careful when characterizing individuals’ atti-
tudes if they are relying solely on subjective judgments
such as attitude certainty, intensity, and importance
(cf. Krosnick & Abelson, 1992). Furthermore, our
results are relevant to research that has used attitude
strength–related properties as a vehicle to predict out-
comes such as attitude change and the attitude-behavior
relation. We would caution that when used as a predictor
of outcomes (see Petty & Krosnick, 1995), subjective
assessments of attitude certainty, intensity, and impor-
tance may themselves be a judgment and not necessarily
a stable feature of an attitude.
One interesting possibility for future research is to use
the manipulation of accessibility experiences to test find-
ings that have been reported in the attitude strength lit-
erature. For instance, Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent
(1995) examined the extent to which self-interest, social
identification, and value relevance affected judgments
of attitude importance. Across a variety of topics, these
researchers discovered that all three constructs were sig-
nificant independent predictors of attitude importance.
In the future, it might be interesting to investigate
whether manipulating the ease with which an individual
generates arguments that support or counter their opin-
ion (as in the studies reported in this article) can influ-
ence participants’ perceptions of the relation between
an attitude and their self-interest, social identification,
and value relevance. Other areas for possible investiga-
tion include assessing the extent to which accessibility
experiences affect persuasive strategies (Swann, Pel-
ham, & Chidester, 1988) and the attention paid to (and
memory for) attitude congruent and incongruent infor-
mation (Howard-Pitney, Borgida, & Omoto, 1986).
Our results are also relevant to discussions concern-
ing the extent to which attitude-relevant judgments are
derived on the basis of available and salient information.
In a recent article on this topic, Wilson and Hodges
(1992) concluded that individuals’ attitudes often vary
as a function of the information that is accessible at the
time of judgment. Furthermore, they suggested that the
extent to which attitudes are derived on the basis of avail-
able information is moderated by strength-related quali-
ties, such that strong attitudes are more stable than weak
attitudes (see also Erber, Wilson, & Hodges, 1995). Our
results are consistent with this proposal. When individu-
als are asked to make judgments about the importance,
intensity, and degree of certainty with which they hold an
attitude, these too can vary as a function of the subjective
experiences associated with recalling attitude-relevant
information from memory. Furthermore, consistent
with Wilson and colleagues’ position (Wilson & Hodges,
1992; Erber, Wilson, & Hodges, 1995), the impact of
accessible information in the derivation of subjective
strength judgments differs as a function of properties of
an individual’s attitude.
Of course, we are not asserting that individuals always
rely on their subjective experiences in deriving judg-
ments of attitude certainty, importance, or intensity. Nor
are we claiming that ease of retrieval is the only source of
information that individuals consider when making
such judgments. Indeed, our data suggest that individu-
als with moderate versus extreme attitudes bring differ-
ent types of information to mind when making these
judgments. Furthermore, these subjective experiences
are likely to be used only when they are perceived as diag-
nostic to the judgment. The aim of our research has
been to demonstrate that individuals can use their acces-
sibility experiences in deriving these judgments and that
temporarily manipulating the type and amount of infor-
mation that is accessible can alter individual’s meta-
attitudinal beliefs about the certainty, intensity, and
importance of their attitudes.
In our research, we examined three different attrib-
utes of attitude strength. Although the relative ease with
which attitude-relevant information came to mind
altered people’s perceptions of their attitudes, judg-
ments of attitude certainty and intensity were more sensi-
tive to the argument generation task than were judg-
ments of attitude importance. How might this weaker
pattern of findings be reconciled with Roese and Olson’s
(1994) proposition that people rely on the ease with
which information comes to mind to judge the impor-
tance of their attitudes? Although judgments of attitude
importance can rest on the accessibility of attitude-
relevant information, what it means to have had an easy
or difficult time bringing this information to mind may
not always be diagnostic of one’s own attitude toward an
issue. For example, people might infer that the ease with
which attitude-relevant information came to mind is
more of a function of how the issue is covered in the
media than of one’s attitude toward the issue.
Implications for Research
on Subjective Experiences
The present results provide additional evidence for
the important role played by subjective experiences in
the derivation of social judgments. There is now a large
number of studies conducted in both laboratory and
nonlaboratory settings that have reached a clear conclu-
sion: Subjective accessibility experiences affect judg-
mental outcomes (see Schwarz, 1998, for a review). In
addition to judgments of attitude strength, ease of
retrieval has been found to influence self-perceptions
(e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), group-based judgments (e.g.,
Rothman & Hardin, 1997), judgments of health risks
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(e.g., Rothman & Schwarz, 1998), and judgments of
stereotypicality (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock,
1998). In many of these studies, researchers have moved
forward to address the question of when these effects are
especially likely to occur. One condition that appears to
enhance the impact of subjective experiences on judg-
ment is the individual’s level of involvement with the
stimulus object. For instance, Dijksterhuis et al. (1998)
examined the extent to which the subjective experiences
associated with recalling gender stereotypic information
affected a subsequent gender-relevant judgment. They
found that ease of retrieval affected the later judgment,
but only among individuals low in prejudice. Further-
more, Rothman and Schwarz (1998) found that the per-
sonal relevance of the issue and the judgment at hand
influenced whether people relied on the ease with which
health-relevant information came to mind. At the same
time, however, it would be overly simplistic to assume
that accessibility experiences influence judgments only
when people process information in a superficial or heu-
ristic manner. In some situations, subjective feeling
states may be perceived as highly applicable to the judg-
ments at hand, and therefore, people will use this infor-
mation even when they are motivated to process infor-
mation systematically (e.g., Rothman & Hardin, 1997,
Study 3). Future research should continue to further our
understanding of the conditions in which subjective
accessibility effects are especially likely to occur. In addi-
tion, future research in this domain should continue to
consider questions such as the range of these effects and
the extent to which subjective experiences affect behav-
ioral outcomes.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our findings suggest that subjective
judgments of attitude certainty, intensity, and impor-
tance are affected by the accessibility experiences that
accompany the recollection of attitude-relevant infor-
mation. Furthermore, these effects are dependent on
the extremity of an individual’s attitude and occur only
when the individual’s subjective experience is diagnos-
tic. As the processes involved in forming strength-related
judgments are still not fully understood, we hope that
our findings will spark additional interest in the topics of
how individuals respond to strength-related questions
and the role of accessible information in the derivation
of social judgments.
NOTES
1. There were no significant gender effects in either study reported
in this article; thus, the data are collapsed across this dimension.
2. For ease of presentation, when we speak of argument type as an
independent variable, support will refer to participants who generated
arguments that supported their preexisting attitude, whereas counter
will refer to participants who generated arguments that countered
their preexisting attitude.
3. We conducted a factor analysis on individuals’ responses to the
certainty, intensity, and importance items. The results revealed a
single-factor solution that accounted for 69% of the variance, further
supporting the decision to create a composite index.
4. In this study, we were unable to preselect participants on the basis
of the extremity of their preexisting attitude. However, we did ask par-
ticipants to report their attitude toward doctor-assisted suicide before
beginning the experimental task. Given the results of Study 1, we were
most interested in examining individuals with moderate attitudes
toward our target issue. Thus, 26 individuals with extreme attitudes
were not included in the analyses that follow. Including these individu-
als does not change any of the results other than to attenuate the mag-
nitude of the effects obtained.
5. Although the results obtained in Study 1 are consistent with the
premise that individuals with extreme attitudes have more accessible
summary assessments of strength-related properties, this study was not
designed to directly test the accessibility of these beliefs. Integrating
measures of response time into future research would allow for a more
direct test of this prediction (Bassili, 1996a, 1996b; Fazio, 1995).
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